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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
TORT: RECOVERY BY A BYSTANDER IN
STRICT LIABILITY
The contemporary trend toward consumer protection in
the law is well illustrated by the extension in a growing
minority of courts of strict tort liability to manufacturers
and retailers for injuries caused by their defective products
to non-user and non-consumer third parties. Former defenses
such as a lack of privity of contract and the absence of a
warranty running with the defective product, which once
thwarted an injured bystander possessing a theoretically valid
complaint, are no longer available to a defendant manufactur-
er or retailer. The courts are beginning to view, more realisti-
cally, the old rules as mere historical preoccupations with
the law of commercial transactions and are basing their new
concepts on public policy considerations.
This judicial activism is demonstrated in the case of
Caruth v. Mirianil in which the Arizona Court of Appeals
reversed on rehearing its previous refusal to extend protec-
tion to injured bystanders. The case presented a typical third
party product liability problem. Due to inherently defective
brakes, the defendant's new 1964 Buick struck the plaintiff's
automobile in the rear. As there was no question of contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, the only issue
presented was whether or not the applicable law permitted
recovery against the manufacturer, General Motors, and the
retailer, Young Buick. In its decision reversing and remand-
ing the judgment that had been rendered in favor of the
manufacturer and retailer, the court pointed out that all
states which have adopted the theory of strict tort liability
have extended its protection to bystanders when confronted
with the appropriate factual situation.2 The court found that
neither the lack of privity nor the absence of any agreement
11 Ariz. App. 192, 463 P.2d 83 (Ct. App. 1970), rev'g 10 Ariz.
App. 277, 458 P.2d 371 (Ct. App. 1970).
2 11 Ariz. App. at 194, 463 P.2d at 85.
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between the plaintiff and the defendants could defeat the
former's valid complaint and stated that concepts applicable
to the law of contracts and sales, which are relationships as-
sumed by agreement, are foreign to strict liability in tort
which is imposed by law for reasons of public policy.
As strict tort liability is founded on the public policy
that the cost of injuries resulting from a defective product
should be borne by the manufacturer that placed the product
on the market, there is no basis for limiting the class of plain-
tiffs to consumers since the risk of harm from the defective
product exists for bystanders and passersby as well as for the
purchaser or user.3 In fact, in Elmore v. American Motors
Corp.,4 the California Supreme Court recognized that bystand-
ers should be entitled to even greater protection than the
consumer where the injury to the bystander is reasonably
foreseeable since the purchasers and users have an oppor-
tunity, which the bystander does not, to inspect the product
for defects an to limit their purchases to articles produced
by reputable manufacturers and sold by reputable retailers.
The landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.3 established that the purpose of strict tort liability is to
make the manufacturer, rather than the injured persons who
are powerless to protect themselves, bear the cost of injuries
which result from the marketing of defective products. In
its opinion the court stated that ". .. a manufacturer is strict-
ly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."6
Several years later, in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.;7
8 Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969).
4 70 Cal. App. 2d 578, 583, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 657, 451 P.2d 84,
89 (1969).
59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
Id. at 60, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700, 377 P.2d at 900.
7 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 986, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).
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the same court for similar reasons held that liability should
also be extended to the retailer of a defective product:
Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the busi-
ness of distributing goods to the public. They are an
integral part of the overall producing and marketing
enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries result-
ing from defective products.8
Since the retailer is in a position to exert pressure on the
manufacturer, he can also play an important role in assur-
ing that the marketed product is free of defects. Extending
strict liability to both the manufacturer and retailer affords
maximum protection to the injured party and works no hard-
ship or injustice on the defendants since they can adjust the
costs of the protection between themselves.9 Thus, these pub-
lic policy considerations outweigh the fear expressed on the
first appeal in the Caruth decision of "impaling the middle-
man on the sword of liability.2
10
The fundamental desire of the recent trend of expanding
strict liability coverage and a major tenet of the underlying
public policy is to achieve maximum protection for the by-
stander by discouraging the marketing of defective products.
This is best accomplished, not only by holding the manu-
facturer liable, but also by imposing on the other members
of the distributive chain the responsibility for marketing those
defective products which cause injury to human beings. The
social policy that underlies strict tort liability resolves itself
into a simple balancing of the public interest as to who should
bear the loss." Is it to be the injured member of the public
or the parties who are in the chain of placing defective goods
on the market? The Caruth court chose to protect the injured
member of the public since the manufacturer and distributors
can distribute the risk of loss between themselves by means
s Id. at 259, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899, 391 P.2d at 171.
9 Id. at 260, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 900, 391 P.2d at 172.
10 10 Ariz. App. at 281, 458 P.2d at 375.
1 11 Ariz. App. at 195, 463 P.2d at 86.
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of insurance and indemnity agreements.12 The court held that
the members of the chain of production and distribution are
better able economically to bear the loss than the injured
party.
The Caruth court stated that the adoption of § 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts by the Arizona Supreme
Court clearly indicated the direction of the law in the state,
even though the section on its face applies only to "users and
consumers" in a broad sense.13 The Restatement expressly
warns that it takes no position on the recovery by a bystander:
There may be no essential reason why such plaintiffs
should not be brought within the scope of the protec-
tion afforded, other than that they do not have the
same reasons for expecting such protection as the con-
sumer who buys the marketed product; but the social
pressure which has been largely responsible for the
development of the rule stated has been a consumer's
pressure and there is not the same demand for the
protection of casual strangers.14
However, several jurisdictions that have accepted the posi-
tion of the Restatement have extended its right of recovery
to mere bystanders, recognizing that there exists no adequate
rationale or theoretical explanation for protecting one class
of plaintiffs and not another once the underlying public policy
is accepted that the manufacturer is best able to control the
dangers arising from defects of manufacture. 5
The use of the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318 by
12 Id. at 196, 463 P.2d at 87.
18 Id. at 194-95, 463 P.2d at 84-85.
14 RESTATEmmNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 402A,
comment o at 356-57 (1965).
15 Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind.
1969) (interpreting the law of Indiana); Mitchell v. Miller,
26 Conn. Sup. 142, 214 A.2d 695 (Super. Ct. 1965); Pierce-
field v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d
129 (1965). See also Klimas v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 297 F. Supp. 937 (D. R.I. 1969).
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courts in some cases has afforded a bystander, under the
theory of an implied warranty, a remedy for injuries sus-
tained due to a defective product.10 The use of the Code has
been especially attractive to injured third parties in those
jurisdictions that have adopted Alternate B of UCC § 2-318
with its right of recovery running to "any natural person"
under a theory of implied warranty. In Wasik v. Borg7 the
court stated that the legislature's choice of the alternate pro-
vision was a strong indication of an intent to extend the right
of recovery to an injured bystander.
The difference between a recovery based on strict tort
liability and a recovery based on an implied warranty may
be more semantic than real since under both theories t h e
primary condition of liability is the defective condition of the
product when it leaves the seller's control.18 However, the
recognition of a right of recovery based on arm implied war-
ranty may be the first step toward extending strict liability
recovery to injured bystanders. For example, in Speed Fasten-
ers v. Newsom, 9 the Tenth Circuit held that the absence of
privity between the plaintiff and defendant was not a bar
to a recovery where an implied warranty is imposed by law
on the basis of public policy. With strict liability firmly es-
tablished in product liability cases in Oklahoma,20 it can be
predicted with reasonable certainty that the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court will extend the right of recovery to an injured
bystander when the appropriate factual situation is presented.
16 Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir.
1967) (finding an implied warranty of merchantability run-
ning to a non-user); Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co., 208
So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1968) (holding that the dangerous instru-
mentality exception to the privity requirement allowed the
plaintiff to sue on an implied warranty theory).
17 423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1970).
Is Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776, 779 (N.D.
Ind. 1969).
19 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967).
20 Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 442 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1971);
Barnhart v. Freeman Equip. Co., 441 P.2d 993 (Okla. 1969).
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However, it should be emphasized that the differences
between strict liability and any warranty theory go to their
conceptual foundations. Strict liability is imposed for reasons
of public policy while express and implied warranties under
the UCC rest upon contract principles with all the intricacies
of the law of sales. Since strict tort liability can not be re-
stricted by such contract principles as lack of privity or limit-
ed because of the absence of any representation to the injured
party, it logically, follows that the recovery afforded by the
theory is available to all potential plaintiffs. The fact that a
manufacturer or retailer attempts to restrict its liability by
contract is immaterial under the theory of strict liability.21
Strict tort liability is based on liability without fault in
the sense that once the injuries of the plaintiff are attributed
to the defective product the defendant's liability is establish-
ed. Questions arise as to whether a defendant manufacturer
owes a duty to a plaintiff to foresee that he will be adverse-
ly affected if the product is defective. The better theory is
that foreseeability is irrelevant in a strict liability case since
the doctrine is premised on loss distribution rather than on
fault. In any event, the requirement that a plaintiff satisfy
a foreseeability test is a negligence concept 22 which thwarts
the public policy underlying the theory of strict liability.
Foreseeability, however, may have a role in determining
whether protection should be extended to a bystander where
the user has knowledge of the defect. In a California case,
Johnson v. Standard Brands,2 the court recognized that a user
may upon discovering defects in a product choose not to use
it, and would extend even greater protection to a bystander:
Where a defective product causes injury to a bystand-
er, the policy of loss distribution is best served by
21 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 260, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 900, 391 P.2d 168, 172 (1964).
22 Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776, 788 (N.D.
Ind. 1969).
2 274 Cal. App. 2d 331, 79 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1969).
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making the manufacturer or retailer liable e v e n
though the product is used with knowledge of the
defect, at least, where it is reasonably foreseeable that
it would be so used.2
4
Therefore, such an injured party would be entitled to recover
even where the defect is obvious to the buyer or user.
Cases like Caruth announce principles of law based on
naked public policy which constitute broad departures from
the former legal theories. Questions remain unanswered not
only because of the hazy state of the law as to the protection
of innocent bystanders, but also due to the fact that so few
jurisdictions have spoken on the subject. However, by ex-
panding the class of plaintiffs that are entitled to recover in
a product liability case, these cases may become as important
as MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,25 which extended to in-
jured third parties a cause of action in negligence, and Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc.,20 which allowed a third
party to recover on a warranty in strict liability. These cases
are establishing new principles of law to fulfill the contem-
porary need of holding the maker of dangerous products liable
to all who are injured by them.
Frederic N. Schneider
24 Id. at 337, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
25 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
26 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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